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Something in the Water? Testing for Groundwater
Quality Information in the Housing Market
Patrick A. McLaughlin
I test the level of information regarding possible groundwater contamination in the residential
real estate market in Washington County, Minnesota. An approximately seven square-mile
trichloroethylene plume has affected hundreds of households’ water supplies since at least 1988
in the region. I ﬁnd that homeowners were initially well-informed by market forces, but were later
somewhat misinformed by government actions regarding the potential of water contamination
from the plume. A disclosure law passed in 2003 may have added new, low-cost, and imperfect
information to the market that could explain the change in informational awareness.
Key words: disclosure law, environmental disamenity, groundwater, groundwater contamination,
hedonic model, incomplete information, water quality, real estate
Introduction
In 1988, an extensive plume of trichloroethylene (TCE), which the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency lists as a potential carcinogen, was discovered in the groundwater in Baytown Township,
Washington County, Minnesota. Many houses and businesses in the area rely on groundwater as the
primary source for water consumption. So, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) and
the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) subsequently took actions to limit human exposure
to TCE and to prevent further spread of the contaminant plume. The contaminant plume is an
environmental disamenity that may negatively affect real estate prices in the area. Well-water
measurements of TCE levels by the MPCA, as well as other actions taken by MPCA and MDH,
contain information that may affect real estate values in different ways, and these effects may not be
limited to only those houses situated on the plume. If the real estate market is completely informed
about the plume’s location, then any negative effect on real estate prices should occur only where
houses could access contaminated water or where contaminated water may occur in the future.
Conversely, if the market is not completely informed about the plume’s location, then houses that
will likely never be affected by the plume could experience a loss in property value.
In this paper, I test for the presence of complete information, incomplete information, or no
information regarding the quality of groundwater in the residential real estate market near the
Baytown Township Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site (Baytown Site or the Site). I also
test the effects of state regulations regarding the Site on information levels and, correspondingly,
prices in the real estate market. The hypotheses that I test are:
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Hypothesis 1: Housing prices reﬂect no information regarding groundwater quality (this is
observationally equivalent to the hypothesis that market participants simply do not value
groundwater quality).
Hypothesis 2: Housing prices reﬂect incomplete information regarding groundwater quality. This
hypothesis might hold if market participants rely on imperfect proxies such as distance from
the contaminant source or state and local regulations for information about present and future
groundwater quality.
Hypothesis 3: Housing prices reﬂect complete information regarding groundwater quality. This
hypothesis might hold if market participants rely on groundwater tests at each house for information
about present groundwater quality and are able to reliably predict future groundwater quality.
One focus of this paper is to determine whether governmental regulations regarding the Baytown
Site induce market reactions. For example, one regulation resulted from the special well construction
area (SWCA) legislation, passed in 1988 and subsequently revised in 2002. The SWCA legislation
and a later statute could affect the real estate market in two ways. The ﬁrst is the geographic
delineation of the area that would be included in the SWCA; any work done on wells inside this
area required special permits and inspections, increasing the cost of new well construction. The
geographic boundaries of the SWCA do not match the edges of the groundwater contamination
plume, and, furthermore,the boundaries of the SWCAchanged once over thetime period I examined
in accordance to changes in regulatory policies regarding the relative toxicity of TCE. Market
participants may rely on the delineation of the SWCA as a proxy for the probability that a house will
have contaminated groundwater, negatively affecting real estate value inside the SWCA. The second
way the SWCA may, indirectly, affect the real estate market is through a Minnesota statute passed in
2003 requiring sellers of property in Washington County to disclose to prospective buyers if property
is located within the SWCA. It is possible that market participants did not possess information
about the SWCA prior to the disclosure law, or that market participants interpreted the creation of a
SWCA disclosure law as a signal that all houses in the SWCA might possess contaminated water.
If the disclosure law either added information regarding groundwater quality or lowered the cost of
information gathering, housing prices in the SWCA might respond accordingly.
The results indicate that during the 1995 - 2002 period, the market was well-informed about the
location of the contaminant plume. Houses that are in the SWCA but not at risk of contamination
did not suffer any loss in property value, while those that are at risk of contamination did. In the
period from 2003 - 2006, after the passage of the disclosure law, houses in the SWCA that were
not at risk of contamination lost property value relative to the previous period. Houses that were
at risk of contamination suffered no more loss in property value than other homes (assumed not to
be at risk) in the SWCA after the passage of the disclosure law. These results imply that market
participants used the lowest-cost information available – namely, whether a house was located in
the SWCA – regarding groundwater quality, even though that information was an imperfect proxy
for the real distribution of risk. Alternatively, these results could indicate that market participants
interpreted the disclosure law as a signal that the contaminant plume might expand, even though the
plume had been relatively stable for many years.
Background
In the residential real estate market, some information about the valued components of a house
is readily observable and quantiﬁable: a prospective buyer can tour a house, count the number
of bedrooms, and test the functionality of bathrooms at a relatively low cost. Conversely, some
components of housing are not as easily observable. For example, a prospective buyer would ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to predict whether the neighborhood will offer adequate “peace and quiet” without spendingMcLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 377
a few weekends in the house listening for raucous neighbors, and prospective buyers regularly rely
on professional house inspectors for information regarding structural integrity.
One implicitly-owned component of a house that is costly to observe is the quality of the
groundwater beneath the property. Groundwater quality presumably would be an important aspect
of houses with private wells used for water consumption. Also, groundwater quality may be
important even if the house had a municipal water supply, because of the possibility of exposure to
groundwater-borne contaminants through some medium other than consumption. While the present
quality of groundwater at a given house can be tested at some expense, it is much more difﬁcult to
predict the future quality of groundwater at that house. One way to predict the future quality level
of groundwater when there is a known contaminant source is to use a groundwater contaminant
transport model. Such a model requires detailed information about the hydrological and geological
featuresinanarea,aswellsigniﬁcantscientiﬁcandmathematicalexpertise.Asanalternative,market
participants may rely on proxies and signals to inform them of quality levels. There are many
possible sources of information about groundwater quality. Some, such as well sample tests and
effective groundwater contaminant transport models, are more accurate sources than others such as
taste, smell, newspaper articles, word of mouth, distance from the contamination source, if known,
or legislated zones like the special well construction area (SWCA). The less accurate sources might
indeed create a misperception of health risk from consumption of groundwater if the information
conveyed does not reﬂect the actual present and probable future groundwater contamination status.
Conveyance of incomplete or incorrect information regarding groundwater contamination might
induce market reactions where none would have otherwise occurred.
Similarly, economists have used a variety of proxies and measures of quality to estimate
environmental disamenities. Several have linked physical measures of water quality to house prices.1
More typically, however, distance from the contaminant source is the only variable available to
researchers. For example, Kiel (1995) looked at sales data around two Superfund sites in Woburn,
MA, using minimum distance to the nearest Superfund as a pollution proxy. Her results showed that
announcement of Superfund status and initiation of Superfund cleanup did not reduce the estimated
negative effect of the contaminated sites on house prices. In fact, Superfund status announcement
and cleanup may have increased the magnitude of the disamenity.2 In contrast, Gayer, Hamilton, and
Viscusi (2002) ﬁnd that site-speciﬁc information releases about risk levels led to both a lowering of
risk beliefs and an increase in house prices.3
In the case of a publicly-known groundwater contamination site such as those in Kiel (1995) and
Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2002), market participants may use some proxy for the probability
of groundwater contamination, such as distance from the contaminant source, the aforementioned
SWCA, or other government legislation requiring prospective buyers to be informed of a house’s
proximity to a groundwater contamination source. Two recent studies show that laws requiring
disclosure of both obvious disamenities such as airport noise (Pope, 2008a) and more subtle
disamenities such as risk of ﬂooding (Pope, 2008b) can affect house prices. In this study, I
note that proxies such as distance from a contaminant source and information from disclosures
laws are often imperfect in their conveyance of house-speciﬁc risk information. In the case of
groundwater, contaminants do not normally migrate away from their source at equal speeds in
1 For example, Steinnes (1992) used Secchi disk readings, which measure turbidity, as did Michael, Boyle, and Bouchard
(1996). Epp and Al-Ani (1979) used pH entered linearly or in dummy variables. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) used median
coliform concentrations at each house. While these studies address surface water rather than groundwater, they use water
quality variables that are not subject to an assumption of spatially uniform distribution.
2 Other examples of studies that use distance as a proxy include Michaels and Smith (1990), which used distance to
nearest hazardous site to measure the impact of hazardous waste sites on house prices in the Boston area and test for estimate
stability across geographic markets. Kohlhase (1991) used distance and distance-squared to examine the impact on house
prices of toxic sites in the Houston area that had been declared as Superfund sites. Nelson, Genereux, and Genereux (1992)
used distance from a landﬁll in Ramsey, Minnesota, to estimate the effects of possible contamination on house sales.
3 Other studies that show that market participants rationally process new information about risk include Viscusi and
O’Connor (1984), Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987), and Smith and Johnson (1988).378 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Figure 1. Location of Washington County in Minnesota
Notes: Washington County abuts the St. Croix River on the east, and St. Paul on the west. It is shaded in the ﬁgure above.
all directions, nor do they tend to follow county or township borders inside which legally created
signals such as the SWCA exist. For instance, a house might be situated a very short distance from a
contaminant source yet have almost zero probability of groundwater contamination from that source
because contaminants are transported away from the house. In such a case, using distance from the
contaminant source as a proxy for the probability of groundwater contamination from that source
would result in an overestimation of that probability.
Baytown Site History
This paper focuses on the level of information regarding groundwater quality that is present in the
real estate market surrounding the Baytown Site at different points in time and how that information
is priced into the housing market. Figure 1 shows the location of Washington County in Minnesota.
Table 1 details a chronology of Baytown Site events.
In 1987, a Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) sampling of wells near a landﬁll at Stillwater
Prison showed the presence of trichloroethylene (TCE) and carbon tetrachloride (CCl4) in the
groundwater. Subsequent testing showed that CCl4 was not widespread or at high levels, and the
primary contaminant of concern became TCE. People who drink water containing TCE in excess
of ﬁve micrograms per liter (mg/L) over many years could experience liver problems and may
have increased cancer risk (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006). The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA) tracked the plume to the Lake Elmo Airport, and in May 1988, MDH
designated an area of Washington County including the known plume and its vicinity as a special
well construction area (SWCA). One MDH document states, “The SWCA informs well owners
and drillers about the potential for contaminated ground water [sic] in the area and serves to
prevent further degradation of the aquifer by requiring proper construction of new wells” (Minnesota
Department of Health, 2004, p. 10). The Baytown Site was added to Minnesota’s State Superfund
Permanent List of Priorities, while U.S. EPA added the site to the Superfund National Priorities List
in 1995.
Further testing found signiﬁcant quantities of TCE below the airport in two aquifers, the Prairie
du Chien aquifer and the Jordan aquifer, both of which are used for drinking water. In 2000,
based on a feasibility study ﬁnished in 1999, MPCA decided to install point-of-use granulated
activated carbon (GAC) ﬁlter systems on certain private wells as the primary remedial action. Tests
performed by the MPCA on post-ﬁlter samples showed that the GAC ﬁlter systems effectivelyMcLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 379
Table 1. Chronology of Site Events
Date Event
6/1987 MDH sampling of private water wells surrounding the Baytown Dump detects several volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), including TCE and CCl4.
5/1988 MDH establishes the SWCA.
1988 Site listed on the Minnesota Permanent List of Priorities (PLP).
12/16/1994 Site listed on the National Priorities List (NPL).
6/1995 MPCA assumed full responsibility for oversight of Site under the Enforcement Deferral Pilot Project.
1999 Consent Order.
4/1999 Feasibility Study (FS) completed for the site.
5/1999 Proposed Plan published.
5/2000 EPA and MPCA executed a Record of Decision (ROD).
1999 onward Site wide water sampling and GAC installation initiated.
1988 to 2001 Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) conducted investigations at and near Lake Elmo Airport.
2002 MDH changes human risk limit for TCE from 30 micrograms/liter to 5 micrograms/liter.
2002 MPCA expands SWCA in accordance with new human risk limit.
2002 to 2004 MPCA conducts investigations designed to identify TCE source area.
2004 MPCA investigations succeed in locating primary TCE source area.
2004 onward MPCA conducts investigation designed to further delineate the nature and extent of the TCE source area
and to characterize the site.
2/2005 Feasibility study completed for TCE plume containment near source.
2005 onward MPCA pursuing design, approval, and implementation of remedial actions addressing the groundwater
contamination plume and source area.
Notes: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Five-Year Review Report: First Five-Year Review Report, 2007b, p.2.
reduced TCE to below critical levels, “indicating that [GAC ﬁltered-] well users were not exposed
to the contaminants” (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2007a, p. 9). Although the source of
contamination was suspected to be underneath the airport, the actual location could not be identiﬁed
sothatitwasnotpossibletoremoveortreatthesource.MinnesotaDepartmentofHealth’smaximum
allowable level of TCE was 30 mg/L. Houses that had water with TCE above 30 mg/L received GAC
ﬁlters. Six ﬁlter systems were installed under this policy prior to 2002. A change in the human risk
limit in 2002 resulted in many more houses receiving GAC ﬁlters at MPCA’s expense. As of March
2007, a total of 162 GAC ﬁlters had been installed and paid for by MPCA. Houses that were built
on parcels platted after April 9, 2002 that had TCE measured above 5 mg/L in private wells were
required to install GAC ﬁlter systems, but the MPCA did not pay for these.
The TCE plume covered about seven square miles in central Washington County in March 2007.
Approximately 650 homes and several businesses rely upon private wells that use the contaminated
aquifers. The MPCA monitors public sentry wells (monitoring wells) and many private wells in the
area, and offers bottled water to residents whose wells exceed the human risk limit until GAC ﬁlter
systems can be installed.
Special Well Construction Area
Legislative and institutional controls may be a source of information for real estate market
participants. One institutional control was the establishment of the special well construction area
(SWCA), the legislation for which was passed in 1988 and revised in 2002. Two factors related to
the SWCA could affect the real estate market. The ﬁrst is the delineation of the area that would be
included in the SWCA. The second is a Minnesota statute (Minn. Statute 103I.236) passed in 2003
that required sellers of property in Washington County to disclose to prospective buyers whether the380 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
property is located in the SWCA. The disclosure must occur if property is not served by a municipal
water system or contains an unsealed well.
The original SWCA legislation identiﬁed a geographic area encompassing the known plume as
well as an extra buffer area. At that time, the U.S. EPA had determined that the maximum allowable
TCE contaminant level in drinking water was 30 mg/L; MDH had adopted the same standard, setting
its human risk level at 30 mg/L. Accordingly, the primary goal for MDH was to ensure that residents
were not consuming water with TCE above the accepted human risk level, and created the original
SWCA with this human risk level in mind. Later, however, regulators expanded the SWCA both
as additional testing discovered the full extent of TCE migration and as EPA policy regarding
the maximum contaminant level for TCE changed. The SWCA has substantial limitations on the
construction, sealing, repair, and location of wells (Minnesota Rule 4725.3650 U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2006; Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2007a). Conversations with well
drillers licensed to drill in and out of the SWCA in Washington County (McCullough, 2007;
Sampson Brothers Drilling, 2007) revealed that the costs of drilling a new residential well inside the
SWCA range from $5,000 to $20,000 more than drilling a well just outside of the SWCA border.
Importantly, house location in the SWCA does not always imply a signiﬁcant increased risk
of groundwater contamination compared to locations outside the SWCA. The original SWCA is
shown in ﬁgure 2, and the expanded SWCA is shown in ﬁgure 3. Additionally, ﬁgures 4 and 5
show the expanded SWCA in relation to the 5 mg/L plume contours in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and
2003. As of 2007, the SWCA was a 12.5 square-mile area surrounding the Baytown Site that did not
perfectlymatchtheknowncontaminantplumes.AccordingtoanMDHsummaryoftheBaytownsite
publishedinApril2006,“TheSWCAincludesagenerousborderareaoutsidetheplume.Manywells
within the SWCA are too far from the plume to be affected [by TCE contamination]” (Minnesota
Department of Health, 2006, p. 1). As ﬁgures 4 and 5 show, the SWCA is drawn along county
quadrant and half-quadrant borders, while the plume is not nearly so well-behaved.
The second component of the SWCA is the statutory requirement of disclosure to prospective
buyers whether the property is located in the SWCA if it is not served by a municipal water
supply or has an unsealed well. This statute, which went into effect at the beginning of 2003, may
have changed the amount or nature of information present in the market regarding groundwater
quality. One goal of this paper is to determine whether there is a difference in the effect of actual
groundwater contamination on house prices and the effect of location in the SWCA, because a
house could be in the SWCA and not have any TCE contamination problems. If the market reacts to
possible water contamination, does it react only where houses have a reasonable possibility of water
contamination, or does it react to the larger, legislatively-deﬁned zone in which some houses do not
haveareasonablepossibilityofwatercontamination?Inthispaper,a“reasonablepossibilityofwater
contamination”isbasedonMPCAinvestigationsandconclusions.Themarketcould,ofcourse,have
a different opinion about which houses have a “reasonable possibility of water contamination.”
Changing the Human Risk Limit
Other legislation may have effects as well. In January 2002, Minnesota Department of Health
responded to a draft EPA health risk assessment for TCE by changing the human risk limit from 30
mg/Lto5 mg/L.Thisresultedinanincreaseintheareaofconcernandcausedasubstantialexpansion
the SWCA. Many more residential wells were suddenly classiﬁed as having groundwater with
TCE above the newly-adopted human risk limit. Anecdotal evidence gleaned from local newspaper
articles and conversations with residents indicates that residents reacted with much concern. Some
residents appear to have used bottled water for all domestic (including pet) consumption despite
the installation of new GAC ﬁlters (Associated Press, p. 1). Other residents worried that the water
they consumed while the human risk limit was at 30 mg/L would have long-term negative health
consequences (Associated Press, p. 1). The increase in media coverage resulting from the changeMcLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 381
Figure 2. Original SWCA
Note: The solid black line shows the border of the SWCA prior to its expansion in 2002.
Figure 3. Expanded SWCA
Notes: The dotted line shows the border of the SWCA after its expansion in 2002. The solid black line shows the old border
of the SWCA on the west and southern ends, where the expansion took place. The expanded SWCA is 12.5 square miles.382 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Figure 4. Expanded SWCA and the 5 Microgram per Liter TCE Contour in Jordan Aquifer
Notes: This shows the 5 mg/l TCE contour in the Jordan aquifer in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The edges of the
contour change somewhat across years, particularly in the east near the St. Croix River and Bayport. The dotted line around
the perimeter is the expanded SWCA. Source: Wenck Associates, Inc.
Figure 5. Expanded SWCA and the 5 Microgram per Liter TCE Contour in Prairie Du
Chien Aquifer
Notes: This shows the 5 mg/l TCE contour in the Prairie Du Chien contour in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The edges
of the contour are relatively stable across time. The dotted line around the perimeter is the expanded SWCA. Source: Wenck
Associates, Inc.McLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 383
probably created a greater public awareness of the possibility of groundwater contamination in the
area.
Any change in a human risk limit may have consequences for the real estate market. The
change might induce people to mistrust human risk limits as determined by governmental agencies.
As a result, even if MPCA declares that some houses have no reasonable probability of future
contamination, potential buyers might still believe that those houses do face some risk. Indeed,
market participants might conclude that no human risk limit set by the MPCA is reliable, that homes
that are outside the SWCA might eventually be inside the SWCA, or that the plume will spread in
the future.
The lower human risk limit resulted in many more houses qualifying for MPCA-ﬁnanced GAC
ﬁlters; houses that existed on property platted before April 9, 2002, and had private wells with TCE
levels above the human risk limit received MPCA-ﬁnanced GAC ﬁlters. On average, each ﬁlter
cost $1,500 to install and $450 every two to six years for replacement and maintenance (Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, 2007b, p. 2, 10). Any wells installed on property platted after April
9, 2002, that accessed groundwater containing TCE levels above the stated limits, however, were
required to have GAC systems installed that would not be paid for by MPCA.
Methods and Data
IfollowRosen’s(1974)hedonicmodel,whichassumesthatconsumersmaximizeutilitybychoosing
the characteristics of the house they buy, given a competitive housing market with a continuous
equilibrium price schedule for house characteristics. Consumers can affect the price they pay by
choosing which house and bundled characteristics they buy, but they cannot affect the equilibrium
price schedule (Palmquist, 2003, p. 3-4).
Empirically, the hedonic model is estimated by using data on the prices of houses and their
characteristics, such as numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms, square footage, etc. One innovation
of this research is the inclusion of multiple variables which measure information regarding the
probability that a particular house has, or will eventually have, contaminated groundwater. The
binary variables “measured and not ﬁltered” (mit) and “SWCA” (sit) indicate whether a house had a
TCE reading of its well water done (as reported by MPCA) at any time prior to the sale and whether
a house is located inside the SWCA, respectively.4 The hedonic model attempts to predict house
prices by quantifying and estimating the marginal prices of all observable house characteristics,
while assuming there is an unobserved stochastic element. The most appropriate functional form of
estimable hedonic models (e.g., linear, semi-log, log-linear, etc.) is an empirical question. Cropper,
Deck, and McConnell (1988) found that linear, semi-log, and linear Box-Cox forms provided the
best accuracy for predicting marginal component prices. In this paper, a semi-log functional form
was chosen. The estimation equation is:
(1) pit =a + bxit + gyi + mmit + ssit + tTit + eit;
where:
pit = natural log of adjusted price of house i at time t (nominal price was adjusted by a GDP
deﬂator, base year 2000),
xit = physical characteristics of the house (square footage, bathrooms, age, lot size, etc.),
yi = locational attributes of the house (school district, proximity to lake or river, etc.),
mit = “measured and no ﬁlter” dummy, equal to 1 if house i had its well tested for TCE prior
to time t and did not receive a GAC ﬁlter prior to time t,
sit = SWCA dummy, equal to 1 if location of house i is in the SWCA at time t, 0 otherwise,
4 I use “measured and not ﬁltered” as a variable rather than the more obvious variable, “measured TCE level,” because of
the possibility of measurement error in the latter.384 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Tit = time dummy, equal to 1 if sale of house i at time t occurred in year T, and
e = iid disturbance term capturing other factors determining housing price. A full listing of
components included in the above variable vectors is provided in table 2.
The primary variables of interest in this baseline speciﬁcation are sit and mit. The coefﬁcients on
these variables will provide tests of the three hypotheses presented in table 3. The hypothesis tests
rely on two assumptions. The ﬁrst is that GAC ﬁlters effectively render water at houses free of TCE.
The second is that mit is an accurate proxy for the probability that a house might eventually have
contaminated groundwater.
Two important estimation issues must be addressed in a hedonic model: spatial extent of the
housing market and the temporal stability of parameter estimates.
Spatial Extent of the Market
Thehedonicmodelestimatesanequilibriumpricescheduleforhousecomponentsinasinglemarket.
Problems can occur when separate markets are treated as one single market, particularly when the
variable of interest is observed only in one of the markets. According to Palmquist, “if there are
a reasonable number of consumers who would consider the alternative areas [as substitutes], then
those areas can be treated as a single market, even if many people only consider one or the other
[area]” (Palmquist, 2003, p. 26). Nevertheless, most researchers consider an urban area to be a single
market, and urban areas often encompass multiple counties. I treat all of Washington County as a
single market. Alternative speciﬁcations were investigated, such as using only the central portion
of the county, which centers on the plume. The results do not differ substantially; all coefﬁcient
estimates were similar in sign and signiﬁcance levels. Furthermore, I include township ﬁxed effects
(32 townships) in all regressions.
Temporal Stability
More important to this study is whether the values of the various characteristics of houses were
relatively stable over the period studied and, if they were not, whether this affects estimates on the
variables of interest. I test information levels regarding groundwater quality present in the real estate
market by estimating changes in the coefﬁcients on sit and mit after certain events which might alter
thecontentandamountofinformationpresentinthemarket,suchastheexpansionoftheSWCAand
the enactment of the SWCA disclosure law. These estimates will be valid only if the contributions of
the other house characteristics to the value of the house were stable over time (Palmquist, 2003, p.
26) or if the contributions of other house characteristics are orthogonal to the coefﬁcients of interest.
I collected data from January 1, 1980, to December 31, 2006. However, any pooling of data over
this entire time period would likely be inappropriate, because the housing market in Washington
County changed drastically over the same period. In the 1980’s, Washington County was largely
agricultural. However, in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, large farms were gradually transformed
into suburban-type subdivisions because of the proximity of St. Paul, MN.5
I pooled data from 1995 through 2006 because it appears that after 1995 the average parcel size
in each year had stabilized. Furthermore, I include yearly ﬁxed effects in all regressions.
Data
House sales and house characteristic data were taken from the Washington County Tax Assessor’s
website. Government legislation variables, such as the delineation of the SWCA, were created using
5 Despite this suburbanization process, there remained large amounts of unused parcels and agricultural lands in the county
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Table 2. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
realprice GDP deﬂator-adjusted sale price of the house, in dollars
Lnprice natural log of realprice
Age age of house at time of sale = year sold less year built; negative values of age were changed to zero.
Agesq newage squared
Tla total living area, in square feet
Lotarea size of parcel, in square feet
bedroomss number of bedrooms
Full number of full bathrooms
Half number of half bathrooms
threequart number of 3/4 bathrooms
Deluxe number of deluxe bathrooms
ﬁreplace number of ﬁreplaces
add1 area of 1st addition in square feet, if it existed at time of sale
Addn area of nth addition in square feet, if it existed at time of sale
gar1 area of 1st garage in square feet, if it existed at time of sale
Garn area of nth garage in square feet, if it existed at time of sale
Ac dummy indicating presence of central air-conditioning system
porcharea area of porch(es) in square feet
deckarea area of deck or patio in square feet
river_dist convex index between 0 and 1 indicating proximity of a house to a river. river_dist=max[1  
(d=dmax)1=2;0], where d is the distance to the nearest river in meters and is dmax set to 500 meters. If
d >500, river_dist=0.
lake_dist convex index between 0 and 1 indicating proximity of a house to a river. lake_dist=max[1  
(d=dmax)1=2;0], where d is the distance to the nearest lake in meters and dmax is set to 500 meters. If
d >500, lake_dist=0.
read_noﬁlt dummy variable equal to one if a house had its TCE level measured by the MPCA prior to sale and had
not received a GAC ﬁlter system, zero otherwise.
Swca dummy variable indicating location inside the SWCA at time of sale
Table 3. Null Hypotheses
Hypothesis Tested Variable(s) of Interest and Their
Coefﬁcients (in parentheses) Reject if:
Hypothesis 1: There is no information about
groundwater in the market.
SWCA dummy: sit(s); measured and
no ﬁlter dummy: mit(m) s 6=0 or m 6=0
Hypothesis 2: There is incomplete information
about groundwater in the market. sit(s);mit(m) s 6=0 and m 6=0
Hypothesis 3: There is complete information
about groundwater in the market. sit(s);mit(m) m =0
various sources including MPCA and MDH documents and their websites. I included all houses sold
between Jan. 1, 1995, and Dec. 31, 2006. Townhouses, condominiums, and apartments sales were
excluded because these types are typically sold bundled with unobservable (to the econometrician)
home owners’ association payments. Table 2 lists and deﬁnes the house sales and characteristic
variables, location variables, and water quality variables. The data are divided into two time periods,
1995 - 2002 (23,270 observations) and 2003 - 2006 (15,341 observations) because of the events that
occur in 2002 related to changing the human risk limit and the disclosure law that went into effect at
the beginning of 2003. Summary statistics for each period are shown in table 4 and table 5. MPCA
provided its well sampling data for houses in and around the SWCA.386 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 4. Summary Statistics, Period 1,a Years 1995-2002
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
realprice 186980.40 158500.00 113687.30 2096.14 1904311.00
Lnreal 11.99 11.97 0.56 7.65 14.46
Full 1.28 1.00 0.59 0.00 10.00
threequart 0.47 0.00 0.56 0.00 4.00
Half 0.36 0.00 0.49 0.00 3.00
Deluxe 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 2.00
bedroomss 3.18 3.00 0.89 1.00 12.00
Tla 1624.91 1401.00 698.31 0.00 9572.00
Lotarea 46499.59 12289.00 121876.40 0.00 2792196.00
Age 19.65 9.00 28.06 0.00 154.00
Agesq 1173.31 81.00 3000.56 0.00 23716.00
ﬁreplace 0.72 1.00 0.71 0.00 9.00
Ac 0.86 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
porcharea 60.14 0.00 101.69 0.00 2011.00
deckarea 104.11 0.00 135.29 0.00 1000.00
schooldist2 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
schooldist3 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
schooldist4 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
schooldist5 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
schooldist6 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
schooldist7 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
schooldist8 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
schooldist9 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
watershed2 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00
watershed3 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00
watershed4 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00
watershed5 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
watershed6 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
watershed7 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
river_dist 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.98
lake_dist 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.95
add1 139.45 37.00 217.81 0.00 3474.00
add2 26.75 0.00 86.21 0.00 1484.00
add3 4.75 0.00 36.27 0.00 960.00
add4 0.02 0.00 1.33 0.00 128.00
gar1 517.71 528.00 259.02 0.00 2800.00
gar2 21.33 0.00 135.62 0.00 2480.00
gar3 0.11 0.00 6.47 0.00 624.00
read_noﬁlt 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00
Notes: a 23,270 observations in Period 1.
Informationregardinggroundwaterqualitycanenterthemarketinmultipleways.Ifthereexisted
complete information in the market and market participants valued uncontaminated water, then
the actual measured contaminant level should consistently reﬂect this with a negative coefﬁcient
estimate. Furthermore, assuming that the GAC ﬁlter systems perfectly remove all TCE prior to water
consumption, then the negative coefﬁcient estimate on the measured contaminant level variableMcLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 387
Table 5. Summary Statistics, Period 2,a Years 2003-2006
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
realprice 301597.70 260356.60 159097.90 1882.93 2412175.00
Lnreal 12.51 12.47 0.46 7.54 14.70
Full 1.19 1.00 0.52 0.00 6.00
threequart 0.48 0.00 0.58 0.00 3.00
Half 0.49 0.00 0.52 0.00 3.00
Deluxe 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 2.00
bedroomss 3.31 3.00 0.91 1.00 12.00
Tla 1793.37 1620.00 760.92 0.00 8886.00
Lotarea 33871.39 10801.00 102164.70 0.00 2586379.00
Age 20.80 11.00 27.43 0.00 158.00
Agesq 1185.28 121.00 3079.81 0.00 24964.00
ﬁreplace 0.81 1.00 0.71 0.00 9.00
Ac 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
porcharea 65.54 0.00 94.70 0.00 1240.00
deckarea 88.86 0.00 129.48 0.00 772.00
schooldist2 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
schooldist3 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
schooldist4 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
schooldist5 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00
schooldist6 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
schooldist7 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
schooldist8 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
schooldist9 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
watershed2 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
watershed3 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
watershed4 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
watershed5 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
watershed6 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
watershed7 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
river_dist 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.98
lake_dist 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.96
add1 141.86 44.00 213.21 0.00 2551.00
add2 38.32 0.00 105.87 0.00 2970.00
add3 8.47 0.00 44.16 0.00 810.00
add4 0.01 0.00 0.38 0.00 38.00
gar1 562.72 576.00 238.78 0.00 2800.00
gar2 16.76 0.00 116.09 0.00 2925.00
gar3 0.49 0.00 22.52 0.00 1840.00
read_noﬁlt 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00
Notes: a 15,341 observations in Period 2.
should decrease after the year 2002 when most of the ﬁlter systems were installed on those houses
with more than 5 mg/L TCE.6
However, it is possible that the contaminant level variable contained measurement errors. Not
all houses’ wells in the dataset were actually tested for TCE. In fact, not even all houses’ wells
6 There were 162 GAC ﬁlter systems installed by the end of 2006. 120 of these were installed in the year 2002.388 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
inside the SWCA were tested for TCE. MPCA tested wells at those houses that are most likely to
have TCE contamination. The decision on which houses are most likely to have TCE contamination
is presumably based on knowledge of where the plume actually is, which aquifer a residential well
uses, and where the plume is most likely to spread. While this cost-minimizing water testing strategy
might be effective in terms of preventing residents from consuming water with more than 5 mg/L
TCE, it does not provide actual measurements at all houses in the dataset. It is probably the case
that all wells with high levels of TCE were tested, but there is still the possibility that some houses’
wells with low (less than 1 mg/L) levels of TCE were not. One certainly cannot assume that untested
wells had zero TCE levels.
Despite this issue, tests of information levels in the housing market are still possible. Information
regarding whether a house has contaminated water or is likely to have contaminated water in the
future is revealed if a house had its water tested by the MPCA. The MPCA tests water at houses
most likely to have TCE contamination, and the dataset contains records of which houses were
tested and when. Thus, mit, a dummy equal to unity if a house had its water tested prior to the sale
and did not have a GAC ﬁlter installed prior to the sale. This variable provides information regarding
MPCA’s opinion of the probability of TCE contamination. The information relayed to the market
is that those houses that were tested were deemed most likely to have contaminated water by the
MPCA. The dataset includes 359 house sales between 1995 and 2006 that occurred after each was
tested for TCE. Assuming that GAC ﬁlter systems reduce the probability of TCE contamination to
zero, observations of house sales for which water was tested and a ﬁlter was installed prior to the
sale receive a value of zero for mit. Houses that had wells tested for TCE were also likely to be
situated near monitoring wells and other visible indicators of possible water contamination. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that potential homebuyers may have been more concerned about possible
TCE contamination at those homes that were tested relative to those that were not. Hence, I place all
house sales into two categories: those with possible contamination issues and those without. Sales
at houses that had their water tested and no ﬁlter installed prior to the sale are in the ﬁrst category.
Sales at houses with wells that ere never tested or with wells that were tested and had ﬁlters installed
prior to the sale are in the second category.
A second source of information regarding possible water contamination is location of a house
in the SWCA. This is particularly pertinent after the SWCA disclosure law went into effect at the
beginning of 2003. However, location in the SWCA does not necessarily mean that a house has
contaminated water. Houses can be inside the SWCA and still have zero TCE in their water. Also,
some houses inside the SWCA never had their water tested. A dummy variable, sit, indicates whether
a house is inside the SWCA at the time of the sale. I examine the effect of location in the SWCA,
sit, and the effect of whether a house’s water was measured, mit, before and after the disclosure law
went into effect. This procedure is used to determine whether the market discounted houses that
the MPCA tested but did not install ﬁlters on (mit =1), regardless of the SWCA, or whether the
market discounted houses that were located in the SWCA (sit =1), regardless of whether the MPCA
decided the house needed its water tested.
Outliers and Erroneous Data
Tax assessors’ sales data often include probable non-market transactions. Evidence for such
transactions is apparent in that 561 different observations of sales of three-bedroom houses have
recorded prices of $0.00. There are possibly other non-market transactions, such as sales of $100.00,
$10.00, or even $1.00, which likely represent intra-family trade, shifting of nominal ownership for
tax purposes, or reﬁnancing. Additionally, some sales records reﬂected other questionable data, such
as negative house ages.7
7 A negative house is age is possible if the house is sold before it is built. However, it seems unlikely that such a sale would
occur more than a few years prior to construction.McLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 389
I addressed these data errors in two ways. First, all observations that seemed obviously either
erroneous or non-market transactions were deleted. Accordingly, all observations of sales at nominal
price of less than $1001 were deleted (1,087 observations). Also, all houses with an age (calculated
as year sold less year built) of less than negative three were dropped on suspicion of erroneous entry
(667 observations), and the few remaining negative ages were changed to zero. A group of houses
that had two sales recorded for the same house on the same day at vastly different prices was deleted
(634 observations).
Second, the presence of outliers was somewhat tempered by the use of quantile regressions,
which “emphasize the middle of the distribution rather than the tails” (Evans, 2007, p. 18). All
quantile regression parameter estimates are reported for the median quantile.
Results
The three hypotheses regarding information levels in the market were tested using quantile
regressions at the median of adjusted house prices using a semi-log functional form.8 Table 6 shows
the results of testing whether “measured and not ﬁltered,” mit, or SWCA, sit, inform the market
about water quality, and whether this changes after the events of 2002 and the implementation of the
disclosure law at the beginning of 2003. In 2002, the human risk limit was lowered from 30 mg/L to
5 mg/L, the SWCA was expanded, 120 of 162 GAC ﬁlters were installed; more newspaper articles
about the Baytown Site were written than any other year; and multiple town meetings occurred
because of residents’ concerns about health risk and property values. I have divided all sales into
two time periods: 1995 - 2002 and 2003 - 2006. Columns 1 and 2 of table 6 show the coefﬁcient
estimates from a quantile regression of the log of real price on housing and location variable vectors
as well as township, school district, watershed, and yearly ﬁxed effects. Column 1 is for Period 1,
1995 - 2002, and Column 2 is for Period 2, 2003 - 2006. All housing and location variables have the
expected signs and most are signiﬁcant in both periods.
For brevity I focus here on only the variables of interest. The variables read_noﬁlt and swca
represent mit and sit, the variables of interest. The coefﬁcient estimate of read_noﬁlt in the ﬁrst
period, 1995 - 2002, is -0.030, or -3.0%, while that of swca is -0.023, or -2.3%. Neither is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, but the coefﬁcient estimate of read_noﬁlt is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. As these
are both binary variables, houses could be in one of four categories: measured, unﬁltered, and in the
SWCA; measured, unﬁltered, and not in the SWCA; not measured (or measured and ﬁltered) and
in the SWCA; and not measured (or measured and ﬁltered) and not in the SWCA. The net effects
for the four groups are obtained by summing the appropriate coefﬁcient estimates from table 6 and
reported in table 7. Wald tests of joint signiﬁcance of read_noﬁlt and swca show that the negative,
net effect on Group 1 (measured, unﬁltered, and in the SWCA) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in both periods.
Column 1 of table 6 shows that the housing market seems to have reacted to the information
captured by the read_noﬁlt variable in the ﬁrst period. The negative coefﬁcient of -3.0% on
read_noﬁlt, statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, indicates that houses with the possibility of
contaminated water sold at a discount of about $4,755 at the median in Period 1. There was no
SWCA disclosure law in place in this period, so market participants may have had little information
about the legislation. Market participants reacted to the information produced by the selection of
houses for measurement: those houses that are tested are also those most likely to have TCE
contamination and, therefore, suffer a “tainted water” discount. The less accurate, in terms of
indicating which homes have a possibility of contamination, proxy swca does not appear to capture
the “tainted water” discount in Period 1. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is complete
information in the market in Period 1.
8 For robustness, ordinary least squares regressions in the semi-log form were also performed. Results of OLS had the
same signs and signiﬁcance levels, but the magnitudes of some coefﬁcient estimates of the variables of interest were greater
than in quantile regressions. Quantile regression results are reported because of possible outlier inﬂuence.390 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 6. Quantile Regressions at Median
Township Fixed Effects Tax Group & Township Fixed Effects
Dep. Var.: lnreal (1) Years: 1995 - 2002 (2) Years: 2003 - 2006 (3) Years: 1995 - 2002 (4) Years: 2003 - 2006
Full 0:047 (15:19) 0:056 (16:88) 0:045 (15:77) 0:055 (17:33)
threequart 0:045 (15:20) 0:055 (19:05) 0:044 (16:22) 0:055 (19:76)
Half  0:021 (6:15)  0:032 (9:63)  0:018 (5:89)  0:029 (8:79)
Deluxe 0:072 (14:50) 0:125 (26:35) 0:072 (15:69) 0:124 (27:21)
bedroomss 0:026 (14:42) 0:026 (13:92) 0:027 (15:90) 0:026 (14:78)
Tla 0:001 (55:97) 0:001 (64:46) 0:001 (60:04) 0:001 (66:12)
Lotarea 0:001 (26:60) 0:001 (41:88) 0:001 (27:98) 0:001 (43:41)
Age  0:003 (18:63)  0:003 (17:89)  0:003 (20:70)  0:003 (19:52)
Agesq 0:001 (7:19) 0:001 (8:32) 0:001 (8:43) 0:001 (9:33)
ﬁreplace 0:053 (22:74) 0:064 (27:69) 0:051 (23:95) 0:062 (27:73)
Ac 0:030 (6:83) 0:017 (3:26) 0:030 (7:39) 0:018 (3:68)
porcharea 0:001 (15:55) 0:001 (26:81) 0:001 (16:72) 0:001 (27:46)
deckarea 0:001 (14:59) 0:001 (14:90) 0:001 (15:00) 0:001 (14:40)
river_dist 0:108 (8:58) 0:140 (9:79) 0:111 (9:50) 0:146 (10:58)
lake_dist 0:099 (7:35) 0:076 (4:55) 0:095 (7:59) 0:062 (3:78)
add1 0:000 (6:30)  0:001 (5:54) 0:001 (6:48)  0:001 (4:98)
add2 0:001 (3:90) 0:000 (0:780) 0:001 (4:26) 0:000 (1:300)
add3 0:001 (2:90) 0:001 (6:06) 0:001 (2:48) 0:001 (6:59)
add4 0:001 (1:010) 0:005 (2:53) 0:000 (1:220) 0:005 (2:57)  
gar1 0:001 (73:95)
 0:001 (47:12) 0:001 (79:89) 0:001 (48:22)
gar2 0:001 (8:47) 0:001 (7:38) 0:001 (9:21) 0:001 (7:94)
gar3  0:001 (2:04) 0:001 (1:87)  0:001 (1:85) 0:000 (0:400)
read_noﬁlt  0:030 (1:73) 0:003 (0:170)  0:024 (1:480) 0:012 (0:670)
Swca  0:023 (1:350)  0:074 (3:67)  0:030 (1:90)  0:080 (4:10)
Constant 11:258 (255:50) 11:887 (252:48) 10:357 (140:74) 11:553 (143:06)
N 23;270 15;341 23;270 15;341
Pseudo-R2 0:4385 0:5854 0:4408 0:5880
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummy variables,
watershed variables, and school district variables are all included in all above regressions; their coefﬁcient estimates are suppressed for brevity
and are available upon request. Several estimates were smaller than 0.001 in absolute value yet statistically different from zero at least the
10% level. These estimates have been represented as 0.001 for ease of reading.
Table 7. Net effects of read_noﬁlt and swca







ﬁltered), in the SWCA
not measured (or
measured and
ﬁltered), not in the
SWCA
Period 1 -3.0% -2.2% = -5.2% -3.0% -2.2% baseline (0)
Observations 223 28 563 22679
P-value 0.0007 0.085 0.179
Period 2 0.0% -7.4% = -7.4% 0.0% -7.4% baseline (0)
Observations 100 8 307 15026
P-value 0.0007 0.8630 0.0000McLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 391
Column 2 shows the results of the same regression for houses sold in the second period, 2003
- 2006. During this period, the SWCA disclosure law was in effect. The coefﬁcient estimate on
read_noﬁlt in the second period equals -0.024 or -2.4% and is not statistically different from zero.
The coefﬁcient estimate on swca went from -0.023 and not statistically signiﬁcant to -0.074 and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In other words, location in the SWCA comported little discount in Period
1, but it led to a 7.4% discount in the second period. That translates to a discount of about $19,266
at the median house price in Period 2.
Thus, across the two periods, the effect of read_noﬁlt changed from likely negative to not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, the effect of swca changed from having no statistically
signiﬁcant effect to causing a substantial “tainted water” discount. The most likely explanation is the
SWCA disclosure law. In the second period, the market discounted all homes in the SWCA. It did
not matter whether a house’s water had been tested by MPCA; the disclosure law indicated to market
participants that location in the SWCA meant a house might have “tainted water.” These results are
consistent with the second hypothesis of incomplete information in Period 2. The “tainted water”
discount appears to apply to homes located in the SWCA in both periods.
Columns 3 and 4 show the results of quantile regressions with township, school district,
watershed and yearly ﬁxed effects as well as property tax group ﬁxed effects, performed for
robustness. Property taxes in Washington County are a function of three location variables:
watershed, school district, and township. Therefore, I added a tax group ﬁxed effect for every unique
combination of the three variables for a total of 82 different tax groups in the dataset. The results
from these regressions are quite similar to those in Columns 1 and 2. However, one noticeable
difference is that, unlike the ﬁrst model, the coefﬁcient estimate on read_noﬁlt is not statistically
different from zero in either period in the tax groups ﬁxed effects model. Also, location in the
SWCA comported a statistically signiﬁcant discount in both periods, but that discount was much
larger in magnitude in the second period. In Period 1, the coefﬁcient estimate on swca equals -0.03
(statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level), and in Period 2 it equals -0.08 (statistically signiﬁcant at 1%
level). Thus, the second model’s results are consistent with the second hypothesis of incomplete
information in both periods.
Both models (township ﬁxed effects and township-and-tax-groups ﬁxed effects), point to a
rejection of the ﬁrst hypothesis, that there is no information regarding groundwater quality in the
housing market. In both models, market participants react negatively to at least one of the indicators
of “tainted water” in both periods.
In both models, the diminution of the cost of learning whether a house is in the SWCA results
in the market actually using a less accurate proxy for the probability of contamination in the second
period.. The “tainted water” discount is no longer captured by the more accurate “measured and not
ﬁltered” variable in the ﬁrst model, and never was captured by it in the second model. Instead, in the
ﬁrst model, the swca discount decreases from a statistically insigniﬁcant -2.3% in the ﬁrst period to
a statistically signiﬁcant -7.4% in the second period. A similar change occurs in the second model:
the swca discount decreases from -3% in the ﬁrst period to -8% in the second period. These results
indicate, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the cost of gathering information is important in determining
what information is incorporated into market prices. In the second period in both models, the market
incorporated incomplete information regarding groundwater quality because it was less costly to do
so.
An alternative interpretation of these results is that there is complete information in the market
in both periods. Market participants interpreted the decision by legislators to force disclosure of
location in the SWCA as a signal that the water contamination might be wider spread than they
thought in the ﬁrst period. If this is the case, the market is forecasting that the plume will spread
farther. There has been some minor spreading of the plume to the east, but overall, it has remained
relatively stable. Only future mappings of the plume will allow a test of whether the impact of the
disclosure law was a result of a change from complete information to incomplete information or a
result of the addition of new, correct information to the market. That is, if the plume does expand in392 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
the future, then the market was indeed forecasting correctly when those homes assumed here to be
“at no risk of contamination” but still located in the SWCA lost some value.
Net Cost of Regulation
In this section, I evaluate how the regulatory changes wrought in 2002 (i.e., at the end of Period
1) affected house values in and around the contaminated area. The affected houses fall into three
different categories: in the SWCA and tested; outside the SWCA and tested; and in the SWCA and
not tested. Of the three categories, the largest group is the “in the SWCA and not tested” group (table
7 shows the number of observations in each group in each time period). To determine the net effect
of regulation, I calculated the realized net effect of the SWCA and water testing in each period for
all the groups. The realized net effect is the actual number of house sales in each group multiplied
by the premium or discount for each group in each time period evaluated at the mean price for the
period. A calculation of realized costs from the net effect of the SWCA and water testing before and
after the disclosure law passed at the beginning of 2003 yields a net effect of -$4,780,541 prior to
the disclosure law’s passage. After the disclosure law was passed, the net effect was -$9,022,566.
This is likely an underestimation because Period 1 includes eight years of sale observations (1995 -
2002) while Period 2 includes only four years (2003 - 2006).
Thus, even a conservative estimate of the effect of regulation in the area shows that homeowners
lost over $4.2 million in equity. A signiﬁcant portion of these houses that lost equity had no realistic
probability of experiencing water contamination from this TCE plume.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have tested information levels regarding groundwater quality and their effects on
house prices. Tax assessor real estate, GIS, and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
testing data were used to evaluate the impacts of a disclosure law mandating that homesellers
inform homebuyers about a house’s location in a special well construction area (SWCA). Prior to the
passage of the law, it appears that the real estate market incorporated relatively complete information
about where trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination was likely to occur. In the preferred model,
only those houses that the MPCA tested because they are the most likely to have contaminated
water suffered a “tainted water” discount during this time period. After the disclosure law passed,
the market incorporates incomplete information about where TCE is likely to occur. This might
have occurred because the disclosure law offered a very low-cost way of gathering information
about groundwater quality, and as a result, all houses in the legislatively-created SWCA suffered a
“tainted water” discount despite many of those houses having uncontaminated water and little to no
possibility of future contamination.
An alternative interpretation of the shift of the “tainted water” discount from those houses that
were tested by the MPCA to all houses in the SWCA is that the disclosure law informed the market
that the plume might spread to other houses in the SWCA. Thus, if the plume spreads to those houses
in the SWCA that presently have no contamination and are viewed by the MPCA as having no risk
of contamination, then the market would have predicted this. To date, however, the plume has spread
little, while the disclosure law was passed in 2003.
These results emphasize the importance of information in markets. Many researchers have
studied market reactions to potentially harmful environmental disamenities. Often, these market
reactions are cited as evidence of non-economic behavior on the part of market participants.
Few studies, however, have questioned the assumption that market participants possess complete
information about the environmental disamenity (Pope (2008a,b) are notable exceptions).
Information acquisition can be costly. When markets react in ways that researchers ﬁnd odd or
“irrational,” it could simply be the case that markets react to incomplete information because
gathering complete information is too costly. When government regulations add more informationMcLaughlin Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market 393
to a market, even if it is imperfect information such as in this case, some market participants will
still rely on it. This may occur even if the information is imperfect because it is often relatively
inexpensive relative to acquiring better information. In its role as information provider, therefore,
governmental agencies possess the potential to distort markets with imperfect information.
[Received December 2009; ﬁnal revision received June 2011.]
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